UnitedStates GeneralAccountingOfficeGAOReport to the Chairman, Subcommittee onRegulation, Business Opportunities, andEnergy, Committee on Small Business,House of RepresentativesJanuary1992OPERATION DESERTSTORMEarly PerformanceAssessmentof Bradleyand AbrmsGAONXAD-92-94

United StatesGeneral AccountineOfficeWashington,D.C. 25548GAONational Security andInternationalAffairs DivisionB-247224January lo,1992The Honorable Ron WydenChairman, Subcommittee on Regulation,Business Opportunities, and EnergyCommittee on Small BusinessHouse of RepresentativesDear Mr. Chairman:In response to your request, we have developed information on the performance of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Abrams tank during the Persian Gulf war. Specifically, you asked that we obtain information fromBradley and Abrams crews on (1) how well their systems performed duringthe war and whether improvements were needed, (2) what types of problems the two systems experienced, and (3) how well combat support vehicles were able to recover or keep pace with the Bradley and the Abrams.On October 23, 199 1, we briefed your staff on the results of our work. Thisletter summarizes the information discussed at that meeting, and appendixes I through IV present more detailed information.Our report is based on information we obtained from Army troops andArmy reports on the war. Army agencies are currently analyzing war dataregarding weapons lethality, systems survivability, and destroyed vehiclesbut are not to report until a later date. When these reports are completed,additional information on the performance of these vehicles may comeforth.During our review we sought information on Bradley and Abrams systemperformance using five parameters:lllllReliability: The degree to which a vehicle is operable (that is, able to move,shoot, and communicate) for combat and the ease with which it can bemaintained.Survivability: The ability of the crew and the vehicle to withstand or avoidhostile fire; includes the vehicle’s armor protection, speed, and agility.Lethality: The ability of the vehicle’s weapon systems to destroy intendedtargets.Mobility: The vehicle’s ability to traverse varying terrains; based on speedand agility.Range: The maximum distance a vehicle can travel without refueling.Page 1GAO/NSIAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abrams

B-247224Results in BriefCrews from both the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Abrams tank, as wellas other Army personnel, praised the overall performance of the vehicles inthe Persian Gulf war. Crews said that the vehicles demonstrated goodlethality and mobility. Survivability of the Abrams was perceived as good bythe crews, and they felt safer in the Bradley A2 modeIs compared to theolder models. Mission capability rates were reported high. Bradley crewsidentified some problems and desired system improvements, such as ahigher reverse speed and a laser range finder. Abrams crews indicated thatits range was limited because it frequently had to stop to (1) refuel to compensate for high fuel consumption and faulty fuel pumps and (2) clean airfilters due to extremely sandy conditions.Bradley and Abrams crews reported problems obtaining repair parts, andmany had exhausted their limited supply of some parts by the end of theloo-hour ground war. Because of these problems, according to some Armylogistics personnel, sustainability could have become a major problem hadthe war lasted longer. Crews also experienced problems in posit,ively identifying enemy targets and in having to use outdated and unreliable radios.Many of the older generation Army vehicles used to support the Bradleyand the Abrams were unreliable and had difficulties keeping up with therapid pace of the offensive assault. For example, Bradley and Abramscrews reported that the Ml 09 self-propelIed howitzer and various Ml 13series combat support vehicles had slowed their movement. The Army hasacquisition programs designed to overcome some of these problems.BackgroundThe Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Abrams Main BattIe Tank are theArmy’s premier ground combat vehicles. Both were fielded in the early1980s. They were designed by the Army to accompany each other intobattle as part of a combined arms team.As of February 26, 1991, a total of 2,200 Bradley Fighting Vehicles were inthe Persian Gulf area. Of these, a total of 1,730 were assigned to thedeployed units, and the remaining 470 Bradleys were held in reserve. Ofthe 1,730 Bradleys assigned to the deployed units, 834 were the newestmode1 Bradley-the A2 high survivability model. Some Army units that didnot have the A2 model Bradley vehicle prior to deploying deployed witholder models but were provided the A2 models as they became available.At the same time, a total of 3,113 Abrams tanks were in the Persian Gulfarea. Of these, 2,024 tanks were assigned to deployed units, and thePage 2GAO/NSIAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abrams

B-247224remaining 1,089 tanks were held in reserve. Of the 2,024 tanks that wereassigned to troops, 1,904 were MlAls, and 120 were Mls. Some Armyunits deployed with the older model Abrams, but most exchanged theirolder model Abrams for MlAls once they were in the Persian Gulf.Bradley PerformedWell, but SomeProblems WereIdentifiedThe Bradley Fighting Vehicle performed well during the war, according tothe observations of commanders, crews, maintenance personnel, and Armyafter action reports. It exhibited good reliability, lethality, mobility, andrange, and crews perceived the A2 model to have good survivability. TheArmy reported readiness rates for the Bradley that were generally 90 percent or higher during the ground war-indicating its high availability tomove, shoot, and communicate during combat. The Bradley proved to belethal, as crews reported that its 25-mm automatic gun was effectiveagainst a variety of targets and that its Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked,Wire-Guided (TOW) missile system was able to destroy tanks. Crews alsosaid the Bradley was fast, maneuvered well in the desert terrain, and exhibited good range. The A2 high survivability model Bradley was praised forits added engine power and maneuverability, and crews felt safer with itsincreased armor protection.Although crews were very satisfied with the Bradley’s performance, theyidentified various hardware deficiencies that they believe should be fmed,though these problems usually did not stop the system in combat. Armyofficials were aware of most of them-leaking radiators, unreliable heaters,and misdirected exhaust-and are planning or are implementing correctiveactions. Army crews also identified other needed vehicle improvements,such as the addition of a laser range finder and an identification of friend orfoe system, better sight magnification and resolution, and a faster reversespeed. Army officials said these and other enhancements were being considered for future vehicle improvements (see app. I).Abrams Was Effective,but Its Range WasLimitedDuring the war, the Abrams tank exhibited good reliability, lethality, survivability, and mobility, but limited range, according to the observations ofcommanders, crews, maintenance personnel, and Army after actionreports. Reported Army readiness rates for the Abrams were 90 percent orhigher during the ground war-indicating a high availability to move, shoot,and communicate during combat. The Abrams was lethal, as crews said its120-mm gun was accurate and its ammunition deadly against all forms ofIraqi armor. Army observers attribute the gun’s high degree of accuracy tosuperior sights, high levels of tank readiness, and soldier training. ThePage 3GAo/NsIAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abram

B-247224Abrams also survived well on the battlefield. For example, according toofficials from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, several MlAl crewsreported receiving direct frontal hits from Iraqi T-72s with minimaldamage. In fact, the enemy destroyed no Abrams tanks during the PersianGulf war, according to the Army. Crews said Abrams tanks were fast andmaneuvered well in the sand.Abrams crews were impressed with the power and performance of theAbrams’ turbine engine, but they were concerned about its high fuel consumption and the need to frequently clean air filters in the sandy desertenvironment. Refueling was a constant concern, and faulty fuel pumpsfurther compounded the problem. The harsh desert environmentdemanded frequent air filter cleaning because sand-clogged filters reducedengine power and speed. In extreme cases, sand damaged engines. Armyofficials are aware of the probIems with high fuel consumption, unreliablefuel pumps, and sand ingestion. They are working on solutions to improvefuel economy, fuel pump design, and the air filtration system. Abramscrews also identified other desired tank improvements, including bettersight magnification and resolution and the addition of an identification offriend or foe system, a turret/hull reference indicator, and driver’s andcommander’s thermal viewers. Army officials said these and otherenhancements were being considered for future Abrams improvements(see app. 11).Problems Common toBradley and AbramsFighting a war in the desert highlighted a number of concerns common toboth the Abrams and Bradley systems. The Army had difficulty establishingan effective parts supply distribution network in the Persian Gulf, Althoughthe Army shipped large quantities of parts to the Persian Gulf area, combatunits experienced problems obtaining repair parts through the establishedArmy logistics system. For example, logistics personnel from the1st Cavalry Division told us that about 60 percent of the parts they wereauthorized had zero balances by the end of the war. To compensate for theinability of the established system to provide needed parts, combat unitshad to search logistics bases for needed parts, to trade with other combatunits, or to take parts from other vehicles. According to some Army personnel, the inability to replenish parts reserves could have impeded sustained combat operations in a longer war.Friendly fire emerged as a major concern in the desert, in part becauseArmy gunners were able to acquire targets at longer ranges than they wereable to positively identify targets as friend or enemy. According to thePage 4GAO/NSIAD-92-94Performanceof BradIey and Abrams

B-247224Army, 23 Abrams were destroyed or damaged in the Persian Gulf area. Ofthe nine Abrams destroyed, seven were due to friendly fire, and two wereintentionally destroyed to prevent capture after they became disabled. Similarly, of the 28 Bradleys destroyed or damaged, 20 were due to friendlyfire. Moreover, weapon system capabilities were not optimized because theweapons’ ranges were greater than the sights’ ranges. Crews also notedproblems with ineffective radios and suggested that a navigation system beinstalled in every Bradley and Abram% Army officials recognized the needfor improvements in these areas (see app. III).Some Combat andSupport VehiclesInadequateThe war experience highlighted significant shortcomings with combat support vehicles and other equipment that supported the Bradley and Abramssystems. The M88Al recovery vehicle proved to be unreliable and wasoften unable to recover the MlAl Abrams tank. The Army did not haveenough Heavy Equipment Transporters, and many experienced performance problems. According to division officers, crews, and maintenancepersonnel, the Bradley and Abrams had to slow down to allow theMl 09 self-propelled artillery vehicles and older M 113 series combatvehicles, with the exception of the Ml 13A3 model, to catch up. Oldercargo trucks were also criticized by division personnel for poor mobilityand reliability (see app, IV).Scope and MethodologyTo obtain information on vehicle performance, we interviewed division,brigade, battalion, platoon, and vehicle commanders, as well as gunners,drivers, mechanics, and logistics personnel who participated in the war.Detailed maintenance records were not consistently available or uniformlymaintained by Army units. Therefore, our primary source of maintenanceinformation was discussions with the Army personnel we identify above. Inaddition, we obtained operational readiness data reported to the U.S. ArmyTank-Automotive Command on the Army Materiel Command’s situationreports. In order to ascertain vehicle performance, we focused on theground war-the period of most intensive use for the majority of the unitswe visited. We visited the following Army units that fought in the war:lllll1 st Armored Division, Ansbach, Germany;1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas;I st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas;2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Nuremberg, Germany; and24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia.Page 5GAO/NSlAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abrams

B-241224-To follow up on crew comments regarding various vehicles’ performanceand problems, we met with Army and Department of Defense officialsresponsible for managing and reporting on the performance of systemsused in the war. Army agencies are now analyzing actual battle damage todetermine more precisely how combat systems performed. We discussedsystems’performance and deficiencies and the status of corrective actionswith officials at the following organizations:the Abrams Tank System Program Office, Warren, Michigan; the Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky;9 the Army Balhstics Research Laboratory, Aberdeen, Maryland;the Army Center for Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;the Office of the Program Manager, Global Positioning System, Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, and Los Angeles Air Force Base, Los Angeles,California;. the Office of the Program Manager, Single Channel Ground and AirborneRadio System, Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey;the Army Foreign Science Technology Center, Charlottesville, Virginia;the Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia;the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen, Maryland;. the Army Missile Command, Huntsville, Alabama;the Army Tank-Automotive Command, Warren, Michigan;the Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems Program Office, Warren, Michigan;the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.; andthe Department of Defense and Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.llllllllllWe conducted our review between April and November 199 1 in accordancewith generally accepted government auditing standards. As requested, wedid not obtain agency comments on this report. However, we discussed theinformation we gathered with Army and Department of Defense programofficials and have incorporated their views when appropriate.We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the House andSenate Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations, the HouseCommittee on Government Operations, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties. WewiIl also make copies available to others upon request.Page 6GAO/NSIAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abrama

B-247224Please contact Richard Davis, Director, Army Issues, at (202) 275-4141 ifyou or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.Sincerely yours,1sFrank C. ConahanAssistant Comptroller GeneralPage 7GAO/MUD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abramsf

ContentsLetterAppendix IBradley PerformedWell, but SomeProblems WereIdentifiedAppendix IIAbrams Tank ReceivesHigh Marks forPerformance, but RangeWas LimitedAppendix IIIIssues Common to theBradley and AbramsSystemsAppendix IVSome Combat andSupport VehiclesInadequate1BackgroundSurvivability EnhancementsGood Reliability, but Some Hardware Deficiencies IdentifiedSurvivability Data Limited, but A2 Modifications IncreasedCrew ConfidenceBradley Is Lethal, but Some System EnhancementsAreDesiredGood Mobility and Range, but Some Improvements y HighSpeed, Mobility, and Maneuverability Demonstrated in DesertWeapon SystemAccurate and Lethal, but Some ImprovementsWantedSurvivabiIiQ HighRange Limited by System Deficiencies2425Combat Units Had Difficulty Obtaining PartsWeapons Outshoot Ability to Distinguish TargetsVehicle Radios Ineffective and UnreliableCrews Would Like a Navigation System in Every Vehicle3131333435383839M88Al Tank Recovery Vehicle Deemed InadequateHeavy Equipment Transporters Suffered From InadequateNumbers and Poor PerformanceM 113 Family of Vehicles Deemed InadequateM 109 Howitzer Lacked SpeedOlder Cargo Trucks Had Inadequate Mobility and LackedReliabilityPage I3GAO/NSIAD-92-94Performance404041of Bradleyand Abrams

ContentsAppendix VMajor Contributors toThis Report42TableTable I. 1: Bradley Hardware Deficiencies15FiguresFigure I. 1: The A2 Bradley Fighting VehicleFigure 1.2: Percentage of Bradley Fighting Vehicles That WereCombat Ready From February 24 Through March 1,1991Figure II. 1: The MlAl Abrams TankFigure 11.2:Percentage of Abrams Tanks That Were CombatReady From February 24 Through March IFVPLGRSINCGARSSLGRTACOMTOWPage 9Army Materiel SystemsAnalysis ActivityBallistics Research LaboratoryCenter for Army Lessons LearnedCavalry Fighting VehicleGlobal Positioning SystemHeavy Equipment Transporteridentification of friend or foeInfantry Fighting VehiclePrecision Lightweight GPS ReceiverSingle Channel Ground and Airborne Radio SystemSmaU Lightweight GPS ReceiverTank-Automotive CommandTube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-GuidedGAO/NSLAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abrams

Appendix IBradley Performed Well, but Some ProblemsWere IdentifiedOverall, according to the observations of commanders, crews, maintenancepersonnel, operational readiness data, and Army after action reports, theBradley Fighting Vehicle proved to be reliable; was perceived to have goodsurvivability; and exhibited good lethality, mobility, and range during thePersian Gulf war. In particular, in those units that had the A2 modelBradley, commanders, crews, and maintenance personnel were impressedwith the added reliability, mobility, and perceived survivability that theA2 Bradley offered. While personnel judged the overall performance of theBradley to be favorable, they noted some automotive and weapon systemproblems and desirable system improvements.BackgroundThe Bradley Fighting Vehicle, initially deployed in 1983, comes in two versions: the M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and the M3 Cavalry FightingVehicle (CFV). The IFV’Smission is to transport the infantry squad intobattle and, once there, to support the squad and the accompanying tanksby suppressing enemy infantry and lightly armored vehicles. The CF’V’S mission is to perform reconnaissance and scouting roles in armored units.Both vehicles have a 25-mm automatic gun; a Tube-Launched, OpticallyTracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) antitank missile launcher; and a coaxialmachine gun.SurvivabilityEnhancementsBecause of concerns about the Bradley’s vulnerability, the Army conducteda series of live-fire vulnerability tests from March 1985 through May 1987.The tests showed that the Bradley, as then configured, was highly vulnerable to anti-armor weapons. As a result, in the late 198Os, the Army beganto incorporate a number of survivability enhancements into a Bradleyhigh-survivability configuration referred to as the “‘A2 model” (see fig. I. 1).The high-sunivability modifications for the A2 model include thefollowing:lllAddition of steel applique armor. This armor, consisting of steel platesadded to existing armor on parts of the turret and hull, increased protection from 14.5 mm to 30-mm ammunition.Addition of spa11liners. Spall liners were added to the interior of the crewcompartment to protect the crew from high-velocity debris (spall) causedby rounds’ penetrating the vehicle.Relocation of ammunition. Twenty-five millimeter ammunition and TOWmissiles stowed internally were moved to less vulnerable areas located inthe rear, lower part of the crew compartment. In addition, to the extentPage 10GAO/MUD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abram6

Appendix IBradley PerformedWere IdentifiedWell, but Some Problemspossible, mines and pyrotechnics (signals and flares) were stowed inexternal rear storage compartments.Addition of attachment points. Attachment points were added to the exterior of the vehicle (the front, sides, and turret) for the purpose of attachingreactive or passive armor tiles. The Army has not yet fielded these tiles.The decision to add passive or reactive armor tiles to the Bradley is underreview.Modification of automatic fire extinguishing system. Current system was tobe modified to incorporate a dual-shot system, which automatically activates after a l/2-second delay to protect against a second hit. To furtherprotect the system, cables were rerouted, and spall protection was added.A dual-shot system has not been added due to affordability constraints.Increase of engine power. The engine’s power was increased from 500- toBOO-horsepower to accommodate the heavier vehicle weight resulting fromsurvivability modifications.Modification of transmission. The transmission was modified to improverehability and to match the horsepower increase of the engine.9 Modification of internal fuel supply system. This system was modified toempty fuel from vulnerable upper fuel cells before fuel from the more protected lower fuel cells is used (upper fuel cells will be emptied after thefirst 40 gallons of fuel are burned).llllPage IIGAO/NSIAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abrams

Appendix 1Bradley PerformedWere IdentifiedWell, but Some ProblemsSource: U.S. Army.Good Reliability, butSome HardwareDeficiencies IdentifiedThe Bradley Fighting Vehicle exhibited good reliability during the PersianGulf war. We measured reliability using operational readiness rates-thepercentage of mission-capable vehicles on a given day. Operational readiness rates reported during the Persian Gulf war at units we visited weregenerally based on whether the vehicIe could move, shoot, andcommunicate. This differed from peacetime reporting standards, which arePage 12GAOiNSLAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abrama

Appendix IBradley PerformedWere IdentifiedWell, but Some Problemsbased on mission-capable criteria specified in the vehicle operator’s andmaintenance manuals. For example, if an A2 model’s engine access doorcannot be raised, the operator’s manual states that the vehicle is to bereported as not mission-capable, However, a vehicle with the sameproblem during the war would typically have been reported asmission-capable because the problem did not affect the vehicle’s capabilityto move, shoot, and communicate.As shown in figure 1.2, the percentage of Bradieys reported as beingcombat ready-based on whether the vehicle could move, shoot, andcommunicate-was near or above 90 percent during the ground war. TheBradley A2s had very high readiness rates-ranging from 92 to 96 percentof the vehicles combat ready throughout the ground war. The older A0 andAl models exhibited readiness rates ranging from 89 to 92 percent of thevehicles combat ready throughout the ground war.The Bradley’s high system reliability, indicated by the availability ratesshown in figure 1.2, was supported by crew and maintenance personnel’sobservations at each unit we visited. Bradley crews and mechanics consistently praised the reliability of the A2 model, citing its improved reliabilityand maintainability over the older models’.Page 13GAO/NSIAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abrams

Appendix IBradley PerformedWere IdentifiedFlgure 1.2: Percentage of BradfeyFighting Vehicles That Were CombatReady From February 24 Through March1,199l‘00ParcaniageWell, but Some Problemsof YissionCapMeVehicles95Lll.l.l”llll.lll. .go #.ll----6580757065605650Feb. 24,1991Feb. 25,1991Feb. 27,1991Feb. 26,1991March 1,1991Persian Gulf Ground War-A2 Model Bradleys-1-1AO/AI Model BradleysNote. Data for February 28.1991, was not available.Source: Army Materiel Command Southwest Asia Situation Reports.While the Bradley exhibited good reliability, crews and mechanics at unitswe visited identified a number of recurring hardware deficiencies, as shownin table I. 1. These deficiencies were relatively minor in that they generallydid not affect the vehicle’s ability to move, shoot, and communicate. Officials from the Army Infantry Center and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems Program Office, as well as Army after action reports, confirmed thesedeficiencies. The Army has recognized these problems and has begun toimplement corrective actions.Officials from the Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems Program Office statedthat they were previously aware of most of the hardware deficiencies listedin table I. 1. and in some cases had already begun to implement correctiveactions.Page 14GAO!NfXAD-92-94Performanceof BradleymdAbrams

Appendix IBradley PerformedWere IdentifiedTable 1.1: BradleyHardwareDeficienciesComponentEngine access door pumpHeatersIntegrated sight unit ballistic door cablesLower side armor skirtsWell, but Some ProbIems“--DeficiencyHydraulic pump on A2 Bradley, used to raisearmored engine access door, frequently. failed. Personnel heaters were not reliable and didnot provide uniform heat distribution.Cables used to close the armored doorsprotecting the sight on A2 Bradley broke.Problem attributed to cables not being strongenough and crews improperly closing doors.Buildup of mud and rock caused lower rear,side armor skirt bolts to shear and skirts topop off on A%.--Machine gunMachine gun subject to sand ingestion.RadiatorRadiators on A2.s developed leaks due tocorrosive residue left on the solder jointsduring manufacture. Radiator grille intake bolts-Heads of bolts that attach radiator screen tohull sheared off.-.Radiator water coolant drain pipeRadiator pipes on A2s leaked due toimproperly prepared weld sites andinadequate pipe strength.--Page 15Corrective actions planned/takenArmy has implemented interim fixes to resolvepump failures. Long-term fix involves redesignof pump unit.Heaters are an across-the-board problemwith Army vehicles. The ArmyTank-Automotive Command (TACOM) hascreated a task force to identify potentialsolutions and has obtained funds for a newheaterprogram.Improved cables and proper closingprocedures for doors distributed to units inthe Persian Gulf Engineering changeimplemented--- to make stronger cables.A strengthened side skirt design has beenapproved. The new design was scheduled tobe put on new production vehicles beginningin November 1991. A decision to install thenew design on existing vehicles is on holdpending availabriity of funding.Redesign in process to modify feed chute toeliminate sand accumulation, and covers arebeing developed to reduce the amount of dirt,sand, and dust entering the turret andmachine--.I -gun.- .-Army has determined current design isacceptable. Corrective action includedadditional rinsing, addition of preservative tofinal rinse, and emphasis on quality control.As an interim fix, units are to use higher gradebolts. Long-term fix will increase the size ofthe bolts in the grille and the number of bolts.-from four to eight.-” Some units received replacement pipes in thePersian Gulf area. Other units rewelded pipes,Modification kit developed to correct problemwill be put on existing vehicles as necessary,and improved materials have been put intoproduction- -.(continued)GAO/NSlAD-92-94Performanceof Bradleyand Abrams

Appendix IBradley PerformedWere IdentifiedComponentTOW missile systemVehicle exhaust outletVehicle hatchesSurvivability DataLimited, but AZModifications IncreasedCrew ConfidenceWell, but Some ProblemsDeficiencyThe TOW launcher, on the Als and A2s,experienced failures from crews’ (1) failing toproperly prepare TOW rounds prior to loadingand (2) loading damaged rounds. Additionallauncher failures were brought about by sandand dust ingestion.AZ’s exhaust outlet directs exhaust incommander’s face and into crewcompartment.Hatches leaked and hatch seals subject tosand damage. Seals built up with sand,making it difficult to close hatches.Corrective actions planned/takenCare of TOW rounds has been emphasized.Design changes have been made to modifylauncher to reduce the frequency of launcherfailures as a resultof crew errors and tocorrect sand- and dust-related problems.Redesign in process to direct exhaust awayfrom vehicle. Prototypes are being tested.Hatch seals are being redesigned forimproved sealing from water, and solutions toreduce sand buildup are being investigated.The U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL), in its ongoing study ofbattle damage, has not drawn any firm conclusions on survivability. As aresult, information on the effectiveness of the steel applique armor andspall liners on the A2 model in withstanding enemy fire is limited. BRL hasdetermined that most of the destroyed Bradley Fighting Vehicles it examined were destroyed in “overmatch” situations. That is, these Bradleyswere destroyed by weapons systems, such as tanks, that far exceeded theirdesigned survivability capabilities. However, BRL indicated that the Bradley’s fire suppression system worked well.According to information provided by the Army’s Office of the DeputyChief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 20 Bradleys were destroyed duringthe Persian Gulf war. Another 12 Bradleys were damaged, but 4 of thesewere quickly repaired. Friendly fire accounted for 17 of the destroyedBradleys and 3 of the damaged ones.The Army has not yet fielded a Bradley with reactive or passive armor tiles.However, commanders and crews who had A2s were glad to have theadded steel applique armor protection, spa11liners, and increased speedand acceleration that the larger 600-horsepower engine offered over theolder models. They stated that the added armor, spall liners, and enginepower made them feel safer.Although the ammunition storage space was changed on the A2 model toimprove survivability, crews said they had carrie

higher reverse speed and a laser range finder. Abrams crews indicated that its range was limited because it frequently had to stop to (1) refuel to com- pensate for high fuel consumption and faulty fuel pumps and