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Apple Inc.Apple corecrypto User Space Module for ARM (ccv10)FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security PolicyModule Version 10.0Prepared for:Apple Inc.One Apple Park WayCupertino, CA 95014www.apple.comPrepared by:atsec information security Corp.9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260Austin, TX 78759www.atsec.com 2021 Apple Inc.This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
TrademarksApple’s trademarks applicable to this document are listed in rademark/appletmlist.html. Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks orservice marks of others.Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 2 of 31
Table of Contents1Introduction . 52Purpose . 52.1Document Organization / Copyright . 52.2External Resources / References . 52.2.1Additional References . 52.33Acronyms . 7Cryptographic Module Specification .83.1Module Description . 83.1.1Module Validation Level . 83.1.2Module Components . 83.1.3Tested Platforms . 83.2Modes of Operation . 93.2.1Approved or Allowed Security Functions . 103.2.2Non-Approved Security Functions . 123.3Cryptographic Module Boundary. 143.4Module Usage Considerations. 154Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces . 165Roles, Services and Authentication . 175.1Roles . 175.2Services . 175.3Operator authentication . 216Physical Security . 227Operational Environment . 237.1Applicability . 237.2Policy . 238Cryptographic Key Management . 248.1Random Number Generation . 248.2Key / CSP Generation . 258.3Key / CSP Establishment . 258.4Key / CSP Entry and Output . 268.5Key / CSP Storage . 268.6Key / CSP Zeroization . 269 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility(EMI/EMC) . 2710Self-Tests . 2810.1Power-Up Tests . 2810.1.1Cryptographic Algorithm Tests . 2810.1.2Software / Firmware Integrity Tests . 29Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 3 of 31
10.1.3Critical Function Tests . 2910.2Conditional Tests . 2910.2.1Continuous Random Number Generator Test . 2910.2.2Pair-wise Consistency Test . 2910.2.3SP 800-90A Health Tests. 2910.2.4Critical Function Test . 2911Design Assurance .3011.1Configuration Management . 3011.2Delivery and Operation . 3011.3Development. 3011.4Guidance . 3011.4.1Cryptographic Officer Guidance . 3011.4.2User Guidance. 3012Mitigation of Other Attacks . 31List of TablesTable 1 Module Validation Level . 8Table 2 Tested Platforms . 9Table 3 Approved and Vendor Affirmed Security Functions . 12Table 3a Non-Approved but allowed Security Functions . 12Table 4 Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security Functions . 14Table 5 Roles .17Table 6 Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode . 20Table 7 Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode . 21Table 8 Module Cryptographic key and CSPs . 24Table 9 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests . 28List of FiguresFigure 1: Logical Block Diagram. 15Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 4 of 31
1Introduction2PurposeThis document is a non-proprietary Security Policy for the Apple corecrypto User Space Module for ARM(ccv10). It describes the module and the FIPS 140-2 cryptographic services it provides. This documentalso defines the FIPS 140-2 security rules for operating the module.This document was prepared in fulfillment of the FIPS 140-2 requirements for cryptographic modules andis intended for security officers, developers, system administrators, and end-users.FIPS 140-2 details the security requirements of the Governments of the U.S. and Canada forcryptographic modules, aimed at the objective of protecting sensitive but unclassified information.For more information on the FIPS 140-2 standard and Cryptographic Module Validation Program pleaserefer to the NIST CMVP website [CMVP].Throughout the document Apple corecrypto User Space Module for ARM (ccv10) is referred as :“cryptographic module”, “corecrypto” or “the module” and “OS” refers to “iOS”, “iPadOS”, “tvOS”,“watchOS” and “TxFW” unless specifically noted. “ccv10” is used to refer to the module version 10.0.2.1 Document Organization / CopyrightThis non-proprietary Security Policy document may be reproduced and distributed only in its originalentirety without any revision, 2021 Apple Inc.2.2 External Resources / ReferencesThe Apple website (https://www.apple.com/) contains information on the full line of products from AppleInc. For a detailed overview of the operating system iOS and the associated security properties refer to[OS] and [SEC]. For details on the OS releases with their corresponding validated modules and CryptoOfficer Role Guides refer to the OS Security Guide in the webpage “Product security certifications,validations, and guidance for OS” [UGuide].2.2.1Additional ReferencesCMVPCryptographic Module Validation c-module-validation-programCAVPCryptographic Algorithm Validation c-algorithm-validation-programFIPS 140-2Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, “FIPS PUB 140-2 SecurityRequirements for Cryptographic Modules,” Issued May-25-2001, Effective /NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdfFIPS 140-2 IG NIST, “Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic ModuleValidation Program,” August, 40-2/fips1402ig.pdfFIPS 180-4Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS)FIPS 186-4Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013, Digital SignatureStandard (DSSFIPS 197Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES)Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 5 of 31
FIPS 198Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198, July, 2008 The Keyed-HashMessage Authentication Code (HMAC)SP800-38 A NIST Special Publication 800-38A, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes ofOperation”, December 2001SP800-38 C NIST Special Publication 800-38C, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes ofOperation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality”, May 2004SP800-38 D NIST Special Publication 800-38D, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes ofOperation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC”, November 2007SP800-38 E NIST Special Publication 800-38E, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes ofOperation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices”, January 2010SP800-38 F NIST Special Publication 800-38F, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes ofOperation: Methods for Key Wrapping”, December 2012SP800-57P1 NIST Special Publication 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management – Part 1:General),” July 2016SP 800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A, “Recommendation for Random Number GenerationUsing Deterministic Random Bit Generators”SP800-132NIST Special Publication 800-132, “Recommendation for Password-Based KeyDerivation”, December 2010SECSecurity nical Overview for all Apple Platformshttps://developer.apple.com/UGuideUser e/tvosLast update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 6 of 31
2.3 AcronymsAESAdvanced Encryption StandardAPIApplication Programming InterfaceCAVPCryptographic Algorithm Validation ProgramCBCCipher Block Chaining mode of operationCFBCipher Feedback mode of operationCMVPCryptographic Module Validation ProgramCSPCritical Security ParameterCTRCounter mode of operationDESData Encryption StandardDHDiffie-HellmannDRBGDeterministic Random Bit GeneratorECBElectronic Codebook mode of operationECCElliptic Curve CryptographyEC Diffie-HellmanDH based on ECCECDSADSA based on ECCEMCElectromagnetic CompatibilityEMIElectromagnetic InterferenceFIPSFederal Information Processing StandardFIPS PUBFIPS PublicationGCMGalois/Counter ModeHMACHash-Based Message Authentication CodeKATKnown Answer TestKDFKey Derivation FunctionMACMessage Authentication CodeNISTNational Institute of Standards and TechnologyOFBOutput Feedback (mode of operation)OSOperating SystemPBKDFPassword-based Key Derivation FunctionPCTPair-wise Consistency TestPRFPseudorandom FunctionRNGRandom Number GeneratorSHSSecure Hash StandardTriple-DESTriple Data Encryption StandardTLSTransport Layer SecurityLast update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 7 of 31
3Cryptographic Module Specification3.1 Module DescriptionThe Apple corecrypto User Space Module for ARM (ccv10) is a software cryptographic module version10.0 running on a multi-chip standalone device. The cryptographic services provided by the module are: Data encryption and decryption Random number generation Generation of hash values Key generation Key wrapping Digital signature generation and verification Message authentication Key derivation3.1.1Module Validation LevelThe module is intended to meet requirements of FIPS 140-2 security level 1 overall. The following tableshows the security level for each of the eleven requirement areas of the validation.FIPS 140-2 Security Requirement AreaSecurity LevelCryptographic Module Specification1Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces1Roles, Services and Authentication1Finite State Model1Physical SecurityN/AOperational Environment1Cryptographic Key Management1EMI/EMC1Self-Tests1Design Assurance1Mitigation of Other Attacks1Table 1 Module Validation Level3.1.2Module ComponentsThere are no components excluded from the validation testing of the Apple corecrypto User SpaceModule for ARM (ccv10). corecrypto has an API layer that provides consistent interfaces to the supportedalgorithms. These implementations include proprietary optimization of algorithms that are fitted into thecorecrypto framework.3.1.3Tested PlatformsThe module has been tested with and without PAA on the following hardware platforms. PAA NEON ispresent in Apple A, S and T series processors.ManufacturerApple Inc.Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4OperatingSystemiOS 13Processor (SoC)Hardware PlatformApple A9iPhone 6S PlusApple A10 FusioniPhone 7 PlusApple A11 BioniciPhone 8 PlusApple A12 BioniciPhone Xs Max 2021 Apple Inc.Page 8 of 31
ManufacturerOperatingSystemiPadOS 13Processor (SoC)Hardware PlatformApple A13 BioniciPhone 11 Pro MaxApple A8iPad mini 4Apple A8XiPad Air 2Apple A9iPad (5th generation)Apple A9XiPad Pro (9.7 inch)Apple A10 FusioniPad (6th generation)Apple A10X FusioniPad Pro (12.9-inch, 2nd generation)Apple A12 BioniciPad mini (5th generation)Apple A12X BioniciPad Pro (12.9-inch, 3rd generation)tvOS 13Apple A10X FusionApple TV 4KwatchOS 6Apple S1PApple Watch Series 1Apple S3Apple Watch Series 3Apple S4Apple Watch Series 4Apple S5Apple Watch Series 5Apple T2Apple T21TxFW 10.15Table 2 Tested PlatformsIn addition to the configurations tested by the laboratory, vendor-affirmed testing was performed on thefollowing platforms:for iOS13: iPhone 6s and iPhone SE with an Apple A9 iPhone 7 with an Apple A10 Fusion iPhone 8 and iPhone X with an Apple A11 Bionic iPhone Xr and iPhone Xs with an Apple A12 Bionic iPhone 11 and iPhone 11 Pro with an Apple A13 Bionicfor iPadOS 13 iPad Pro (12.9) with an Apple A9X iPad (7th generation) with an Apple A10 Fusion iPad Pro (10.5-inch) with an Apple A10X Fusion iPad Air (3rd generation) with an Apple A12 Bionic iPad Pro (11-inch) with an Apple A12X BionicCMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of thegenerated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validationcertificate (IG G.5).3.2 Modes of OperationThe Apple corecrypto User Space Module for ARM (ccv10) has an Approved and non-Approved modes ofoperation. The Approved mode of operation with security functions listed in Table 3 is configured bydefault and cannot be changed. If the device starts up successfully then corecrypto framework haspassed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode. Any calls to the non-Approved securityfunctions listed in Table 4 will cause the module to assume the non-Approved mode of operation.The module transitions back into FIPS mode immediately when invoking one of the approved ciphers as allkeys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) handled by the module are ephemeral and there are no keysand CSPs shared between any functions. A re-invocation of the self-tests or integrity tests is not required.Even when using this FIPS 140-2 non-approved mode, the module configuration ensures that the selftests are always performed during initialization time of the module.1The user for Apple T2 are iMac Pro, Mac Pro, Mac mini, MacBook Air and MacBook ProLast update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 9 of 31
The module contains multiple implementations of the same cipher as listed Table 3. If multipleimplementations of the same cipher are present, the module selects automatically which cipher is usedbased on internal heuristics. This includes the hardware-assisted AES (AES-NI) and SHAimplementations.3.2.1Approved or Allowed Security FunctionsThe Algorithm Certificate Numbers (Table 3) are obtained from NIST for successful validation testing ofthe cryptographic algorithms implementations of the module that runs on the hardware platforms listed inTable 2Please refer to [CAVP] website for the current standards, test requirements, and special abbreviationsused in the following tables.CryptographicFunctionRandom NumberGenerationStandard andAlgorithmAlgorithmCertificateNumberModes and Options[SP 800-90A] DRBG CTR DRBGModes:A7 (c asm)A8 (c ltc)A10 (vng asm)AES-128AES-256Derivation Function EnabledWithout Prediction ResistanceHMAC DRBGA8 (c ltc)Modes:A9 (vng ltc)HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256,HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512Without Prediction ResistanceSymmetric Encryption [FIPS 197]and DecryptionAESSP 800-38 ASP 800-38 DSP 800-38 EKey Length: 128, 192, 256A7 (c asm)A8 (c ltc )Modes:ECBCBCCCMCFB8CFB128CTRGCMOFBXTS (key length: 128and 256-bits only)Key Length: 128, 192, 256A11 (c glad)Mode: CBCKey Length: 128, 192, 256Modes:ECBA10 (vng asm)GCMCTRCCMKey Length: 128, 192, 256A6 (asm arm)ModesECBCFB128CBCOFB[SP 800-67]Keying Option: 1; All Keys IndependentTriple-DESModes:ECBCBCCFB8Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4XTS (key length: 128and 256-bits only)A8 (c ltc )CFB64CTROFB 2021 Apple Inc.Page 10 of 31
CryptographicFunctionKey WrappingStandard andAlgorithmSP 800-38 DModes and OptionsKey Length: 128, 192, 256Modes:AES-GCMAES-CCMSP 800-38 FKey Length: 128, 192, 256Modes:AES-KWDigital Signature and [FIPS186-4]Asymmetric KeyRSAGenerationKey Generation (ANSI X9.31),Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096[FIPS 186-4]ECDSAANSI X9.62Key Pair Generation (PKG):P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521Public Key Validation (PKV):P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521AlgorithmCertificateNumberA7 (c asm)A8 (c ltc )A10 (vng asm)A7 (c asm)A8 (c ltc)A8 (c ltc )A9 (vng ltc)Signature Generation (PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS)Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096Signature Verification (PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS)Modulus: 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096A8 (c ltc )A9 (vng ltc)Signature Generation:P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521Signature Verification:P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521Message DigestKeyed Hash[FIPS 180-4]SHS[FIPS 198]HMACModesSHA-1SHA-224SHA-256SHA-384SHA-512A8 (c ltc )A9 (vng ltc)ModesSHA-256A122 (vng neon)Key size: 112 bits or greaterModes:A8 (c ltc )A9 (vng HMAC-SHA-512Key size: 112 bits or greaterA122 (vng neon)Modes:HMAC-SHA-256KAS FFC Component [SP800-56A]DLC PrimitivePublic key size: 2048-bitsPrivate key size: 256-bitsCVL: A8 (c ltc )NIST Curves: P-256, P-384CVL: A8 (c ltc )Diffie-HellmanKAS ECC Component [SP800-56A]DLC PrimitiveEC Diffie-Hellman2The S1P and S3 from the armv7 processor family do not implement vng neon and do not have the A12 ACVT certificate.Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 11 of 31
CryptographicFunctionKey DerivationStandard andAlgorithm[SP 800-132]PBKDFModes and OptionsAlgorithmCertificateNumberPassword Based Key Derivation using HMAC with Vendor AffirmedSHA-1 or SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512A8 (c ltc )PRFsA9 (vng ltc)RSA Key Wrapping[SP800-56B]KTS RSA-OAEPModulus size: 2048, 3072 or 4096-bitsVendor AffirmedTable 3 Approved and Vendor Affirmed Security FunctionsCryptographicFunctionStandard andAlgorithmModes and OptionsAlgorithmCertificateNumberRSA Key WrappingNon-[SP 800-56B], PKCS#1 v1.5IG D.9,Modulus size: 2048, 3072 or 4096-bits[SP800-131A]Non-Approved,but AllowedKey AgreementIG D.8[ANSI X9.63][SP 800-56A]EC Diffie-HellmanECC curves P-256, P-384Non-Approved,but Allowed[ANSI X9.42][SP 800-56A]Diffie-HellmanKey sizes:2048-bitsNon-Approved,but allowedMessage DigestDigest Size: 128-bitNon-Approved,but AllowedRandom NumberGenerationN/ANon-Approved,but Allowed;MD5(used as part of theTLS keyestablishment schemeonly)NDRNGprovided by theunderlyingoperationalenvironmentTable 3a Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions3.2.2Non-Approved Security FunctionsCryptographic FunctionUsage / DescriptionRSASignature Generation /ANSI X9.31Key Pair GenerationSignature Verification /Asymmetric Key GenerationSignature GenerationKey Size 2048Key sizes: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed intable 3Signature VerificationCaveatNon-ApprovedKey Size 1024Key sizes: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed intable 3Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 12 of 31
Cryptographic FunctionUsage / DescriptionCaveatPKCS#1 v1.5 and PSSSignature GenerationKey sizes: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed intable 3Key Size 2048Signature VerificationKey sizes: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed intable 3Key Size 1024RSA Key WrappingPKCS#1 v1.5 and KTS RSA-OAEPKey Size 2048Non-ApprovedECDSAAsymmetric Key GenerationKey Pair Generation for compact point representation of points Non-ApprovedECDSASignature Generation /Signature Verification /Asymmetric Key GenerationPKG: Curve P-192PKV: Curve P-192Signature Generation: Curve P-192Signature Verification: Curve P-192Non-ApprovedIntegrated Encryption Scheme on Encryption / Decryptionelliptic curvesNon-ApprovedDSA used for Diffie-Hellman Key [SP800-56A]Generation onlyNon-ApprovedDiffie-HellmanKey agreement scheme using key sizes different than 2048bitsNon-ApprovedEd25519Key AgreementSignature GenerationSignature VerificationNon-ApprovedANSI X9.63 KDFHash based Key Derivation FunctionNon-ApprovedRFC6637 KDFKDF based on RFC6637Non-ApprovedDESEncryption / DecryptionNon-ApprovedCAST5Encryption / Decryption:RC4Encryption / Decryption:Key Sizes: 8 to 4096-bitsNon-ApprovedRC2Encryption / Decryption:Non-ApprovedMD2Message DigestDigest Size: 128-bitsNon-ApprovedMD4Message DigestDigest Size: 128-bitsNon-ApprovedRIPEMDMessage DigestNon-ApprovedKey Size: 56-bitsNon-ApprovedKey Sizes: 40 to 128 bits in 8-bit incrementsKey Sizes: 8 to 1024-bitsDigest Sizes: 160-bitsBlowfishEncryption / DecryptionNon-ApprovedOMAC (One-Key CBC MAC)MAC generationNon-Approved[SP800-56C]Key Derivation FunctionNon-CompliantLast update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 13 of 31
Cryptographic Function[SP800-108] KBKDFUsage / DescriptionModes:Counter (CMAC-AES128, CMAC-AES192, CMACAES256)Feedback (HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-2)Counter (HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-2)Modes:Feedback (HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-2)Counter (HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-2)Triple-DESEncryption / DecryptionCaveatNon-CompliantA8 (c ltc )Non-CompliantA9 (vng ltc)Non-CompliantTwo Key ImplementationOptimized Assembler (asm arm) ImplementationEncryption / DecryptionMode: CTRAES-CMACAES-128/192/256 MAC generation / verificationNon-CompliantTable 4 Non-Approved or Non-Compliant Security FunctionsNote: A Non-Approved function in Table 4 is that the function implements a non-Approved algorithm,while a Non-Compliant function is that the function implements an Approved algorithm but theimplementation is either not validated by the CAVP or/and the self-tests are not implemented (IG 9.4).3.3 Cryptographic Module BoundaryThe physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the iPhone, iPad, Apple TV, Apple Watchor T2 running iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, watchOS or TxFW respectively. Consequently, the embodiment of thecryptographic module is a multi-chip standalone.The logical module boundary is depicted in the logical block diagram given in Figure 1.Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 14 of 31
iOS/ iPadOS/ wathOS/ TvOs/ TxFWFigure 1: Logical Block Diagram3.4 Module Usage ConsiderationsA user of the module must consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module: AES-GCM IV is constructed in accordance with [SP800-38D] section 8.2.1.in compliance with IGA.5 scenario 1. The GCM IV generation follows RFC 5288 and shall only be used for the TLSprotocol version 1.2. Users should consult [SP 800-38D], especially section 8, for all of the detailsand requirements of using AES-GCM mode. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored,the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed. AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTSdata unit does not exceed 220 blocks When using AES, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the functionsof ccaes [cbc ecb ] [encrypt decrypt] mode. When using SHA, the user must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the functionsccsha[1 224 256 384 512] di. In order to meet the IG A.13 requirement, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encryptmore than 216 64-bit blocks of data.Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 15 of 31
4 Cryptographic Module Ports and InterfacesThe underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C language Application Programming Interfaces(APIs). In detail these interfaces are the following: Data input and data output are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable serviceinvocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers. Hereafter, APIs and callable services willbe referred to as “API”. Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated APIparameters and the mach-o header holding the HMAC check file Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each API listspossible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C language APIs withinthe module is provided in the header files and the API documentation. Messages are documentedalso in the API documentation.The module is optimized for library use within the OS user space and does not contain any terminatingassertions or exceptions. It is implemented as an OS dynamically loadable library. The dynamicallyloadable library is loaded into the OS application and its cryptographic functions are made available. Anyinternal error detected by the module is reflected back to the caller with an appropriate return code. Thecalling OS application must examine the return code and act accordingly. There is one notable exception:ECDSA and RSA do not return a key if the pair-wise consistency test fails.The function executing FIPS 140-2 module self-tests does not return an error code but causes the systemto crash if any self-test fails – see Section 10.The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented returncodes, thus indicating the module’s status. It is the responsibility of the caller to handle exceptionalconditions in a FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner.Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers.Cryptographic bypass capability is not supported by the module.Last update: 2021-03-17Version: 1.4 2021 Apple Inc.Page 16 of 31
5Roles, Services and AuthenticationThis section defines the roles, services and authentication me
Mar 17, 2021 · iPhone 6s and iPhone SE with an Apple A9 iPhone 7 with an Apple A10 Fusion iPhone 8 and iPhone X with an Apple A11 Bionic iPhone Xr and iPhone Xs with an Apple A12 Bionic iPhone 11 and iPhone 11 Pro with an Apple A13
