DHS Did Not Adequately orEfficiently DeployIts Employees to U.S.Military Installations inSupport ofOperation Allies WelcomeJuly 27, 2022OIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityWashington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.govJuly 27, 2022MEMORANDUM FOR:The Honorable Alejandro N. MayorkasSecretaryDepartment of Homeland SecurityFROM:Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.Inspector GeneralSUBJECT:DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently DeployIts Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support ofOperation Allies WelcomeJOSEPH VCUFFARIDigitally signed by JOSEPHV CUFFARIDate: 2022.07.27 13:02:52-04'00'Attached for your information is our final report, DHS Did Not Adequately orEfficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support ofOperation Allies Welcome. We incorporated the formal comments from DHS inthe final report.The report contains three recommendations DHS can implement to avoidpotential staffing shortages in future operations and to improve DHS’ ability todeploy and support its employees during emergency operations. Based oninformation provided in your response to the draft report, we consider onerecommendation resolved and closed and two recommendations resolved andopen. Once your office has fully implemented the open recommendations,please submit a formal close out letter to us within 30 days so we may closethem. The letter should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreedupon corrective actions. Please send your response or closure requests [email protected] with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we willprovide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight andappropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. Wewill post the report on our website for public dissemination.Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Thomas Kait,Deputy Inspector General for the Office of Inspections and Evaluations, at(202) 981-6000.Attachment

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTSDHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently DeployIts Employees to U.S. Military Installations inSupport of Operation Allies Welcome July 27, 2022Why We Did ThisEvaluationAs the lead Federal agency forOperation Allies Welcome, DHSdeployed its employees toU.S. military safe havens toassist with resettlement ofAfghan evacuees. We conductedthis evaluation to determineDHS’ effectiveness recruiting,deploying, and managing theDHS employees detailed to orvolunteering at the safe havens.We conducted fieldwork fromNovember 2021 to January2022, including visiting six ofeight safe havens where DHSemployees served.What WeRecommendWe recommend one action DHScan take to avoid potentialstaffing shortages in futureoperations and two actions toimprove DHS’ ability to deployand support its employeesduring emergency operations.What We FoundAs the lead Federal agency for Operation AlliesWelcome (OAW), the Department of HomelandSecurity coordinated efforts across the FederalGovernment to resettle individuals evacuated fromAfghanistan. Part of DHS’ responsibility was staffingsafe havens at U.S. military installations with enoughdetailed DHS employees to carry out specificleadership and support roles. DHS advertised thesedetail opportunities to its employees but did notdirect components to commit all necessary staff anddid not initially receive funding. Therefore, DHS didnot fill all the positions. DHS also recruited employeevolunteers through the DHS Volunteer Force (VF).However, DHS could not reimburse components forthe costs of travel and overtime, making somecomponents reluctant to fund the volunteerdeployments and further limiting the number of DHSemployees at safe havens. The shortage of DHSemployees affected the safe havens’ ability to providecertain services to Afghan guests. Also, some DHSemployee volunteers told us they did not feeladequately supported before and during deployments.Some described difficulty reaching the DHS VF, andothers were uncertain about how to make travelplans or complete administrative paperwork. Overall,we determined DHS did not have a structure tosupport volunteers for unfunded operations such asOAW.DHS ResponseDHS concurred with all three recommendations. Weconsider two recommendations resolved and openand one recommendation resolved and closed. SeeAppendix B for DHS’ full response.For Further Information:Contact our Office of Public Affairs at(202) 981-6000, or email us hs.govOIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland Security Table of ContentsBackground . 2 Results of Evaluation . 5 DHS Did Not Deploy Enough Staff to Adequately Support theOAW Mission at U.S. Military Installations . 5 DHS Did Not Fully Support Employee Volunteers Deployed toU.S. Military Installations for OAW . 10 Conclusion. 13 Recommendations . 13 Management Comments and OIG Analysis . 13 AppendixesAppendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology . 16Appendix B: DHS Comments to the Draft Report . 17Appendix C: Office of Inspections and Evaluations Major Contributorsto This Report . 20Appendix D: Report Distribution . SAUCGUSCISVFwww.oig.dhs.govU.S. Customs and Border ProtectionDepartment of DefenseDepartment of StateFederal CoordinatorFederal Emergency Management AgencyFederal Law Enforcement Training CentersU.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcementnongovernmental organizationOperation Allies RefugeOperation Allies WelcomeDHS Deputy SecretaryTransportation Security AdministrationUnified Coordination GroupU.S. Citizenship and Immigration ServicesVolunteer ForceOIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityBackgroundAs part of its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States conductedevacuation operations for tens of thousands of people, including particularlyvulnerable Afghans such as journalists, human rights workers, and women’srights activists and those who worked alongside the U.S. military anddiplomats. On July 14, 2021, the White House announced1 Operation AlliesRefuge (OAR),2 led by the Department of State (DOS), to support the relocationof interested and eligible Afghan nationals and their immediate families.Through OAR, evacuees from Afghanistan were temporarily relocated to “lilypads,”3 where they underwent screening and vetting prior to being flown to theUnited States. The Department of Homeland Security deployed approximately300 personnel from its components4 to lily pads to conduct processing,screening, and vetting in coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD),DOS, and other Federal agencies.After screening and vetting, Afghan evacuees traveled to a U.S. port of entry,5then to a temporary processing center.6 DOS worked with DOD and DHS tocoordinate an estimated 600 civilian and nongovernmental organization (NGO)staff to transition Afghan evacuees into the resettlement process. Most Afghanevacuees then traveled to one of eight U.S. military installation “safe havens”7to reside as guests while awaiting resettlement in the United States. At thesafe havens, Afghan guests received medical screenings and other medicalservices and could apply for immigration status and work authorizationsthrough U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, Jul. 14, etary-jen-psaki-july-14-2021/.2 OAR was a U.S. military operation to airlift certain at-risk Afghan civilians, U.S. embassyemployees, and other prospective Special Immigrant Visa applicants from Afghanistan.3 Lily pads — located in Bahrain, Germany, Kuwait, Italy, Qatar, Spain, and the United ArabEmirates — were used to temporarily shelter people evacuated from Afghanistan.4 Specifically, employees from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigrationand Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), United StatesCoast Guard (Coast Guard), and United States Secret Service (Secret Service) deployed to lilypads.5 Most Afghan evacuees arrived at Dulles International Airport in Virginia or PhiladelphiaInternational Airport in Pennsylvania.6 DOS managed a 24 hour, 7 days a week processing site at the Dulles Expo Center, nearthe Dulles International Airport, with an estimated staff of 200 to 250 from DOS and theU.S. Agency for International Development. These individuals welcomed the Afghan arrivalsand processed them for onward travel to one of eight U.S. military installations. In addition,DOD managed a 24 hour, 7 days a week processing site in Camden, New Jersey.7 DOD provided Afghan guests with temporary housing at eight U.S. military installationsreferred to as “safe havens”: Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; Fort Pickett, Virginia; FortLee, Virginia; Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Bliss, Texas;Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; and Camp Atterbury, Indiana.1www.oig.dhs.gov2OIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityOn August 29, 2021, the President directed DHS to lead Operation AlliesWelcome (OAW),8 an interagency collaboration to support and resettlevulnerable Afghans.9 OAW then began facilitating the continued processing,medical screenings and vaccinations, and other necessary services for Afghanevacuee resettlement in the United States by managing interagencycoordination efforts, including those needed to operate and staff the safehavens.Following the President’s directive, the DHS Secretary appointed a SeniorResponse Official and established a Unified Coordination Group (UCG).10 TheUCG consisted of representatives from DHS, DOS, DOD, and the Departmentof Health and Human Services, to coordinate implementation of a broad rangeof services for Afghan guests. The UCG conducted its work in closecollaboration with DHS partners in state and local governments, NGOs, andthe private sector to ensure Federal resources, authorities, and expertise wereunified and synchronized.To achieve its mission, the UCG recruited DHS employees to go on detail tosafe havens in leadership and other roles. On September 1, 2021, the UCGSenior Response Official appointed a Federal Coordinator (FC)11 to each of theeight safe havens to oversee the interagency operation. DHS also detailedemployees to the safe havens to oversee and perform support functions, suchas law enforcement and external affairs duties. To further staff the safehavens, on October 1, 2021,12 the DHS Deputy Secretary (known within DHS Memorandum on the Designation of the Department of Homeland Security as Lead FederalDepartment for Facilitating the Entry of Vulnerable Afghans into the United States., Aug. 29, 2021.9 As of Jan. 28, 2022, DHS had supported the resettlement of more than 54,000 Afghans fromsafe havens. On Feb. 19, 2022, DHS announced all remaining Afghans who were housed at itslast operational safe haven, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, had departed. DHS alsoclarified that it was working to transfer domestic safe haven operations from DOD installationsto a single non-DOD domestic facility as it continued to welcome vulnerable Afghans to theUnited States.10 According to the DHS National Response Framework, Fourth Ed., Oct. 28, 2019, a UCG ismade up of senior leaders representing state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federalinterests, and in some instances included local jurisdictions, the private sector, and NGOs.A UCG is responsible for determining staffing levels and coordinating staff based on incidentrequirements. Further, a UCG should include operations, planning, public information, andlogistics to integrate personnel for unity of government effort.11 OAW FCs were typically Senior Executive Service employees designated to coordinate Federalresponse efforts to ensure that Federal resources and authorities were used in a unified,synchronized manner to support the goals of OAW.12 At this time, some DHS employees were already supporting safe havens in volunteer anddetail positions. In August 2021, prior to the S2 component-specific quotas, DHS emailed allemployees requesting personnel to support the relocation of Afghan nationals.8www.oig.dhs.gov3OIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland Securityas S2) requested seven components13 provide 17814 volunteers to performvarious general support duties, such as guest property management, mealpreparation, interpretation, and supply runs.Throughout OAW, DHS employees deployed to support safe havens in one ofthree ways:xDirected detail deployments — DHS employees directed by the UCG orDHS leadership to fill a role at a safe haven;15xVoluntary detail deployments — DHS employees recruited by safe havenleadership from their home or other components and deployed to safehavens to serve in various roles in support of OAW; orxDHS Volunteer Force (VF)16 deployments — DHS employees registered asvolunteers through the DHS VF program and typically deployed to safehavens as “generalists.”17Overall, DHS employees detailed to or volunteering at the safe havens camefrom DHS Headquarters (HQ) and all components.We evaluated DHS’ effectiveness recruiting, deploying, and managing itsemployees detailed to or volunteering at safe havens in support of OAW. Toachieve our objectives, we visited six of eight safe havens, where we interviewedDHS employee detailees and volunteers supporting OAW. We also spoke toDHS HQ officials and reviewed documents and data provided by the UCG andDHS VF and gathered during our site visits. To further understand the DHSVF processes and procedures, we sent written questions to the DHS VFcomponent coordinators and analyzed the responses. This report presentsfindings and recommendations to help DHS ensure preparedness to rapidlydeploy its employees and avoid staffing shortages in future operations. The following components received a request for a specific number of volunteers to supportOAW: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (22 volunteers requested), FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) (17), Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers(FLETC) (7), DHS HQ (initially 65, reduced to 63 on Nov. 3, 2021), TSA (28), the Coast Guard(29), and the Secret Service (10). CBP, USCIS, and ICE were exempt from providing volunteersbecause they were already providing ongoing support for Afghan resettlement or the Southwestborder migration surge.14 The DHS VF reduced DHS HQ’s volunteer quota from 65 to 63 on Nov. 3, 2021, decreasingthe total quota from 178 to 176.15 This type of deployment also included Coast Guard members who were activated anddeployed to support OAW at the safe havens.16 The DHS VF was first activated as a temporary, Federal-wide volunteer force to assist withresponding to the 2021 Southwest Border Migration Surge. The DHS VF has also been used tostaff and support other non-Stafford Act incidents.17 This deployment type also included FEMA reservists deployed and tracked by the DHS VF.13www.oig.dhs.gov4OIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityResults of EvaluationAs the lead Federal agency for OAW, DHS coordinated efforts across theFederal Government to resettle individuals evacuated from Afghanistan. Partof DHS’ responsibility was staffing safe havens at U.S. military installationswith enough detailed DHS employees to carry out specific leadership andsupport roles. DHS advertised these detail opportunities to its employees butdid not direct components to commit all necessary staff and did not initiallyreceive funding for employee travel and overtime expenses. Therefore, DHS didnot fill all the positions. DHS also recruited employee volunteers through theDHS VF. However, DHS could not reimburse components for the costs of traveland overtime, making some components reluctant to fund the volunteerdeployments and further limiting the number of DHS employees at safe havens.The shortage of DHS employees affected the safe havens’ ability to providecertain services to Afghan guests. Also, some DHS employee volunteers told usthey did not feel adequately supported before and during deployments. Somedescribed difficulty reaching the DHS VF via email, and others were uncertainabout how to make travel plans or complete administrative paperwork.Overall, we determined DHS did not have a structure to support volunteers forunfunded operations such as OAW.DHS Did Not Deploy Enough Staff to Adequately Support theOAW Mission at U.S. Military InstallationsUCG objectives included providing for the safety and security of Afghanevacuees from their arrival in the United States through resettlement,including “ensur[ing] humanity, empathy, and compassion for all evacuees”while prioritizing resettlement.18 To successfully accomplish the resettlementmission, the UCG established detail positions necessary for each safe haven,and the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer established quotas for thenumber of DHS employee volunteers needed from 7 of 14 components.19 TheUCG solicited employees to fill the detail positions by sending emails tocomponent leadership announcing the vacancies. To request volunteers, theDHS Deputy Secretary sent letters to component heads announcing the quotasand encouraging them to support the OAW mission. However, throughoutOAW the UCG did not fully staff the detail positions, and the DHS VF nevermet the quota. In fact, the DHS VF only met 38 percent of the volunteer quota(67 of 176) at the peak20 of volunteer deployments. Unified Coordination Group Management Plan, Dec. 07, 2021 – Dec. 14, 2021.19 CBP, ICE, and USCIS were not assigned quotas, but they were not excluded from providingvolunteers.20 Nov. 16, 2021.18www.oig.dhs.gov5OIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityBetween September 14,2021, and January 25,2022, DHS employeesaccounted for only 3 percentof the staff at safe havens.21Partners such as DOD,which supplied nearly87 percent of staff, assumedthe majority of responsibilityfor providing staff at safehavens.Although multiple agencies and NGOs supplied staff to the safe havens, someFCs and other safe haven leadership stated there were not enough DHS staff toaccomplish the resettlement mission, particularly at the start of safe havenoperations.DHS Did Not Detail Enough Employees to Fill Specific Roles Identified bythe UCG as Necessary for Safe Haven OperationDHS was responsible for coordinating the OAW response and the resettlementeffort among its Federal partners.22 The UCG identified detail positionsnecessary for each safe haven and shared those requirements withcomponents. The identified positions included various specialized skillsets,such as budget unit leaders, public affairs officers, interpreters, and logisticsand medical affairs officers. Initially, DHS and the UCG had no direct fundingallocated to ensure they could meet basic safe haven resource needs, includingfilling the detailed positions with DHS employees. The UCG could not pay foremployees’ deployment-related expenses such as travel, lodging, rentalvehicles, or overtime pay. Although the UCG filled some of the detail positions,three FCs at safe havens reported relying on their home components to fill rolesthe UCG could not. Further, a UCG official told us that filling the FC roles withSenior Executive Service employees from offices near safe havens allowed theFCs to use their local staff to fill detail positions.Funding23 and availability of personnel affected the UCG’s ability to find anddetail staff to the safe havens. Staff at four safe havens we visited told us the We used weekly (Tuesday) Senior Leadership Brief data from Sept. 14, 2021 (first iterarion ofreport we received with staffing breakdown by agency), to Jan. 25, 2022, for our calculation.22 The UCG organizational chart from Oct. 2021 lists DHS, DOD, Department of Justice, DOS,and the Department of Health and Human Services as primary participants.23 A Dec. 3, 2021 continuing resolution granted the UCG 147,456,000 for OAW, including theprovision of staffing and support services for safe havens. The UCG applied the appropriatedfunds to pay for travel, benefits, salaries, and overtime related to deployments of DHS staff tosafe havens, related contracts and purchases, and reimbursement to components for traveland overtime incurred. Before the appropriation, the UCG was unable to award new contracts21www.oig.dhs.gov6OIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityUCG did not fill requests for staff in most cases, including multiple leaders whosaid they requested staff from the UCG and received none. Safe haven leadersand UGG staff shared their belief that components did not want to pay foremployee details and speculated their reluctance was exacerbated by thenearness to the end of the fiscal year24 and because they were operating undera continuing resolution.25 Instead, FCs requested staff directly from theirhome components, usually from their own field offices. In some cases, the FCsused funds from their field office budgets to pay for deployment-relatedexpenses. The majority of staff requested and deployed from FC homecomponents were from ICE and CBP, and as a result, the missions of thosecomponents may have been adversely affected. One Deputy FC stated the OAWmission was a “big hit for operations” within that component because anestimated 60 percent of the senior staff was detailed for 2 months.DHS led the coordination efforts and generally provided law enforcement staffat the safe havens. However, the majority of safe haven staff were employeesfrom other Federal agencies and NGOs, whom DHS relied on to perform OAWmission duties. Responsibilities performed by OAW partners varied by safehaven, but at every location DOD provided housing, meals, medical care,cultural and religious services, and recreation, at a minimum, and suppliedapproximately 87 percent of staff across the safe havens. Safe haven leadersreported a positive working relationship with DOD at the safe havens, but oneDeputy Federal Coordinator stated that DHS staff shortages affected themilitary’s mission because DOD had to commit additional staff to compensate.The same leader stated his safe haven team sent what he believed were“conservative and realistic” requests for employees to the UCG that wentunfulfilled and that it was “embarrassing” for DHS [safe haven] leadership tohear from a DOD general that the base cannot afford to lose any more soldiersto the OAW mission without it impacting mission readiness. A DOD OIGreport26 confirmed these impacts by explaining how the extensive use of MarineCorps Base Quantico military personnel disrupted normal DOD operations.27 or make purchases for OAW and thus was restricted to using existing resources from otherFederal agencies, primarily DOD and DOS.24 The fiscal year ended on Sept. 30, 2021. According to a Sept. 8, 2021 memo from the UCGSenior Response Official, FCs were appointed to safe havens on Sept. 1, 2021. The firstvolunteer arrived at a safe haven on Sept. 13, 2021.25 According to Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-11, Section 123.1, “Continuingresolutions (CRs) are joint resolutions that provide continuing appropriations for part of a fiscalyear or for a full fiscal year [and] often enacted when the Congress has not yet passed newappropriations bills by October 1 or when the President has vetoed congressionally passedappropriations bills. Because of the nature of [CRs], [agencies] should operate at a minimallevel until after [their] regular fiscal year appropriations are enacted.”26 DOD OIG, Report No. DODIG-2022-050, Management Advisory: DoD Support for theRelocation of Afghan Nationals at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, Jan. 5, 2022.27 At the time of reporting, DOD OIG had issued reports about all eight safe havens (Fort Lee,Fort Pickett, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Fort Bliss, Fort McCoy, and Joint Base McGuireDix-Lakehurst, Camp Atterbury, and Holloman Air Force Base.)www.oig.dhs.gov7OIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland SecurityThe shortage of detailed employees forced some safe haven leadership toconsider limiting the types of services provided to guests. For example, at onesafe haven a detailed USCIS employee who answered more than 400 guestquestions per day was nearing the end of deployment and funding issuesprevented USCIS from sending a replacement. Safe haven leadership wasconcerned about a decline in guest morale should they not have someone toanswer questions about the resettlement process. The FC contemplated askingthe Deputy FC, a USCIS employee, to fill that role instead of remaining inleadership. Additionally, resource managers at the safe havens reported thatthey repeatedly asked staff to fill positions such as social workers,pharmacists, and teachers, but the UCG did not send staff in most cases.Absent the adequate number of staff to fill the specific roles, DHS employees atsafe havens strived to continue offering vital services such as counseling forwomen, general education, and USCIS staff availability. DHS staff providingthese services reported working 10-12 hours per day, 7 days per week, withone DHS employee having worked 190 hours in a pay period in addition toremaining on call 24/7. Safe haven leadership and personnel expressedconcern that they would eventually have to limit the vital services withoutadditional staff resources from the UCG.DHS VF Did Not Send Volunteers to Safe Havens Quickly and Never MetQuotas for Volunteers Needed at OAW Safe HavensThe DHS VF did not supply volunteers to the safe havens quickly orsufficiently. The Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer established, and theDHS Deputy Secretary disseminated, quotas for the number of DHS employeevolunteers needed from components, but those quotas remained unmet duringsafe haven operations, as shown in Figure 1.28 A UCG official stated thatfulfilling the quotas was not mandatory and therefore did not help the UCG, asit could not “milk anything from the rocks.” Another UCG official indicated thevolunteer process was inefficient and ineffective and described communicationbreakdowns between the DHS VF and the UCG, which negatively affected thenumber of volunteers sent to safe havens.In contrast, when the DHS VF received a request to deploy volunteers overseasin support of OAR, it facilitated arrival of the first volunteer on site within3 days,29 despite never having deployed DHS volunteers overseas in prior We developed Figure 1 using data from Oct. 24, 2021, to Jan. 20, 2022, as the VF did notproduce the S2 Daily Report (a daily report generated by the DHS VF to report the number ofdeployed volunteers, by component) or any other report tracking the OAW volunteer workforceoutside those dates. Figure 1 data begins on Oct. 26, 2021, and ends on Jan. 18, 2022, as weselected data from 1 day a week (Tuesday) for the duration the S2 Daily Report was produced.29 In an Aug. 20, 2021 email, the DHS Deputy Under Secretary for Management requested DHSemployees volunteer for the DHS VF to assist with the relocation of Afghan evacuees. By Aug.23, 2021, the DHS VF had deployed eight volunteers overseas – five to Ramstein Air Base,Germany and three to Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar – in support of OAR.28www.oig.dhs.gov8OIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland Securitysituations. In 2019, the DHS VF supplied volunteers to assist CBP with amigrant surge at the Southwest border.30 One Deputy FC recalled the“amazing” response from the DHS VF during that event and, upon hearing theDHS VF was coming to his safe haven, assumed it would be amazing again. Heinstead expressed disappointment and surprise that an insufficient number ofvolunteers arrived at the safe haven throughout his deployment.Figure 1. Weekly Count of DHS Volunteers at Safe Havens,October 26, 2021, to January 18, 2022*Source: DHS OIG analysis of DHS VF S2 Daily Reports* The DHS VF did not produce reports prior to Oct. 24, 2021; on Tuesday, Dec. 28, 2021; orafter Jan. 20, 2022, even though safe havens were open.Although the DHS VF has experience quickly deploying volunteers, in this caseit was challenging because no separate funding was available for OAW and thecomponents had competing mission needs. The DHS VF resources were stillbeing used to support operations at the Southwest border, and componentexemptions also decreased the pool of eligible volunteers. On average DHS metonly 30 percent of the S2 established quota for volunteers, with varying resultsfrom its components.In addition to the funding issues and a limited volunteer pool, we identifiedother causes for delayed deployments and insufficient numbers of volunteers,such as how the DHS VF processed volunteer applications. DHS VFcomponent coordinators suggested that slow processing by the VF affected how CBP paid the travel and overtime expenses for volunteers supporting OAR and the Southwestborder migrant surge.30www.oig.dhs.gov9OIG-22-54

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERALDepartment of Homeland Securitymany volunteers were deployed. For example, coordinators shared thatapplicants who were ready to deploy were not contacted until severa

to reside as guests while awaiting resettlement in the United States. At the safe havens, Afghan guests received medical screenings and other medical services and could apply for immigration status and work authorizations through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 1 . Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, Jul. 14, 2021.